Discussion on crisis Stabilizing Mali & the Sahel

Coalition/Joint Force Land Component Command Operations

Planning for Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations

JP 3-07 Stability (Excerpt)

3 August 2016

1

Executive Summary

Stability Operations Functions

Stability operations

functions.

The tasks within each

function are crosscutting,

generating effects across

multiple sectors.

While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization

among them depends on the mission and conditions of the

operational environment, the stability operations functions,

as a framework, are a tool to help visualize the conduct of

an operation, sequence necessary activities within an

operation, and develop appropriate priorities for those

activities and resource allocation. Individually, the

functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that

constitute stability activities in a functional sector.

Collectively, they are the pillars upon which the USG

frames the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort.

The functions described here are security, humanitarian

assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of

law, and governance and participation.

Strategic communication.

Joint force staffs must

carefully ensure that

messages are consistent

with actions and vice

versa.

Although not discussed specifically in any given functional

area, strategic communication themes and messages, fully

coordinated with other operational activities, enhance the

legitimacy of HN forces and ultimately the stability of the

HN. Public affairs and IO provide the “words,” supported

by the “deeds” of stability operations and CMO.

2

Executive Summary

Stability Operations Functions—Security

The military provides the

security on which stability

can be built.

Security activities seek to protect and control civil

populations, property, and territory. They may be

performed as part of a military occupation during or after

combat, to help defeat an insurgency, or in response to a

humanitarian disaster. Security activities conclude

successfully when civil violence is reduced to a level

manageable by HN law enforcement authorities.

The security requirements vary greatly across the range of

military operations, and the JFC should consider security

actions based on the mission and his understanding of the

operational environment.

In addition to providing security as required, a major joint

force role in stabilization may be to provide support for

security sector reform (SSR). Beyond simply providing

security, SSR includes the broad set of policies, plans,

programs, and activities that a government undertakes to

improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.

Transformational activities and activities that foster

sustainability in the security sector generally fall under the

rubric of SSR.

To plan for and execute an intervention, CDRs and their

staffs conduct an in-depth analysis to provide relevant

background concerning existing dynamics that could

trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The key

lies in the development of shared understanding among all

agencies and countries involved about the sources of

violent conflict or civil strife. This conflict diagnosis

should deliver a product that describes the context, core

grievances and resiliencies, drivers of conflict and

mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or

decreasing conflict.

Military contribution.

When the joint force is

providing security, the

Department of Defense

will normally have the

lead role in this area;

otherwise, this area is

generally led by the United

States Agency for

Separating warring parties involves establishing distinct

areas of control that keeps factions apart and allows the

joint force to monitor their actions. The establishment of

security fundamentally requires a monopoly on the use of

force by a single entity. In stabilization efforts, the goal is

normally to support a legitimate HN governmental

authority that holds this monopoly, using it to protect the

population, or to help that authority attain the monopoly.

Toward this goal, joint forces take action to support efforts

to end ongoing conflict, build HN security force capacity,

JP 3-07 3

Executive Summary

International

Development’s Bureau of

Democracy, Conflict, and

Humanitarian Assistance.

and disarm adversary forces. DOS’s Bureau of Political-

Military Affairs and various intelligence services could also

play significant supporting roles.

Territorial Security. Side-by-side with the monopoly on

the use of force, the HN government must also be in control

of its borders, and must be able to reasonably monitor and

control movement within its borders, particularly

movement by adversaries. Territorial integrity is a

necessary condition in which ordinary citizens and

legitimate goods are able to move in relative freedom

within the country and across its borders, while illicit

commodities and individuals that present threats to security

are denied free passage.

Public order is one of the

functions of governance

that affects early

perceptions of the

legitimacy of the state and

thus will almost always be

one of the first and most

important public tasks.

Public Order and Safety. Although the Armed Forces of

the United States are not designed or trained, by and large,

to be a constabulary force, the joint force may be called

upon to conduct certain constabulary functions on a

temporary basis until HN or other security forces can

assume those responsibilities. This requirement is largely

driven by the size and presence of the joint force,

particularly in the immediate aftermath of war or other

devastating events.

Protection of Indigenous Infrastructure. Both the short –

and long-term success of any stabilization effort often relies

on the ability of external groups to protect and maintain

critical infrastructure until the HN can resume that

responsibility.

Protection of Personnel Involved in the Stabilization

Effort. The joint force may be called upon to provide

protection for civilian personnel from the United States or

other nations that are assisting in the stabilization effort.

Interagency or international memorandums of agreement

will be required in this instance, laying out specific rules

and responsibilities, as well as rules of engagement. Only

on the rarest of occasions will military forces provide

protection for NGO personnel, and only when directly

requested; many NGOs feel that their reputation for

4

Executive Summary

neutrality, that is their independence from US or any other

political and military influence, forms the basis of their

security—joint forces must be careful not to impinge upon

this reputation.

Threats and

vulnerabilities.

Everyone present during stabilization efforts has the

potential to influence the course of events in ways which

may be positive or negative. The CDR will strive to

understand the full range of participants and their

motivations, aspirations, interests, and relationships.

Generically, the participants can be divided into six

categories based on their aims, methods, and relationships:

adversaries, enemies, belligerents, neutrals, friendlies, and

opportunists.

Security response. Population Security. To provide protection to the population, JFCs employ a range of techniques. Not all will

be popular.

Static protection of key sites (e.g., market places or

refugee camps).

Persistent security in areas secured and held (e.g.,

intensive patrolling and check points).

Targeted action against adversaries (e.g., search or strike

operations).

Population control measures (e.g., curfews and vehicle

restrictions).

Countering Adversaries. Direct military action against

adversaries may be a central component of a stabilization

effort. In which case, setting the conditions for a negotiated

political settlement will entail breaking the ideological,

financial, or intimidatory links within and among different

adversarial and belligerent groups, as well as between them

and the broader population.

Tailored Approaches. A well-targeted, differentiated

strategy for engaging the various participants can transform

the strategic geometry of the conflict. Such a strategy may

allow the CDR to co-opt once adversarial or belligerent

groups into the emerging political settlement.

Security Force Organization. The JFC may organize joint

forces into a number of different composite units for the

purpose of establishing security in and among the

5

Executive Summary

population; these include framework forces, strike forces,

surge forces, and specific focus task forces.

The HN government may

require firm advice, as

well as financial support,

to sustain the capabilities

required.

Security Force Assistance. The generation and subsequent

training of indigenous security forces should be conducted

in a coordinated manner with broader SSR initiatives such

as the development of civilian oversight bodies, judiciary

and detention institutions, as well as transitional justice

mechanisms and disarmament, demobilization, and

reintegration programs.

Transitions. The JFC should consider moving from an international

military security lead to an indigenous lead as soon as

practicable. The ability to transfer this responsibility will be

a function of two inputs: the threat and the capacity of

indigenous security forces.

Stability Operations Functions—Humanitarian Assistance

The humanitarian assistance function includes programs

conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social

well-being of the population. Social well-being is

characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and

services (water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health

services), the provision of primary and secondary

education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those

displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social

fabric and community life.

Civilian development agencies generally break

humanitarian assistance into three categories: emergency

humanitarian and disaster assistance; shorter-term

transition initiatives; and longer-term development

assistance. These generally parallel the military approach of

initial response activities, transformational activities, and

activities that foster sustainability; however, in the civilian

agencies, each category has distinct operational approaches,

staff, and resources.

Armed Forces of the United States participation in

humanitarian assistance generally falls into one of two

categories. Humanitarian assistance that provides support

to alleviate urgent needs in an HN caused by some type of

disaster or catastrophe falls under the rubric of FHA.

Humanitarian assistance conducted as part of programs

6

Executive Summary

designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to

provide for the health and well-being of its populace

typically falls under the rubric of NA.

Evaluation and

assessment.

It is normally appropriate to base measures of effectiveness

(MOEs) for humanitarian assistance on The Sphere Project

Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster

Response. The Sphere Project, developed by IGOs and

NGOs involved in humanitarian assistance, recommends

key indicators for provision of water, sanitation, food,

health, shelter, and non-food items in disasters, and

establishes voluntary minimum standards for each sector.

Military contribution. Dislocated Civilian (DC) Support Missions. These missions are specifically designed to support the assistance

and protection for DCs. A “dislocated civilian” is a broad

term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced

person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a

migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These persons may

be victims of conflict or natural or man-made disaster.

Typically, the United Nations (UN) or other IGOs and

NGOs will build and administer camps, if needed, and

provide basic assistance and services to the population.

However, when the US military is requested to provide

support, DC support missions may include camp

organization (basic construction and administration);

provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and

protection); and placement (movement or relocation to

other countries, camps, and locations).

Trafficking in Persons (TIP). Simply stated, TIP is

modern-day slavery, involving victims who are forced,

defrauded, or coerced into labor or sexual exploitation.

Ongoing TIP in an area undermines ongoing stabilization

efforts, as well as US and HN legitimacy. Ongoing security

activities, such as border protection and freedom of

movement activities, should support the HN’s battle

against TIP.

Emergency Food Assistance and Food Security. IGOs

such as the World Food Programme, NGOs such as

Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, and

USG agencies such as USAID can be expected to provide

for the food needs of the relevant population. In some

7

Executive Summary

cases, military involvement may consist of providing

security for food aid warehouses and delivery convoys in

uncertain and hostile environments.

Shelter. Although the basic need for shelter is similar in

most emergencies, considerations such as the kind of

housing needed, the design used, what materials are

available, who constructs the housing, and how long it must

last will differ significantly in each situation.

Humanitarian Demining Assistance. DOD humanitarian

demining programs are coordinated by the designated

CCDR humanitarian mine action program manager, funded

by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Overseas

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid funds, and

coordinated with interagency partners by the office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.

Public Health. Joint force operations to rebuild and

protect infrastructure, potable water, proper sewage

disposal, and essential health services that contribute

significantly to the health of the HN population must be

closely planned and coordinated with the HN ministries and

USG agencies responsible for health sector redevelopment

assistance. The JFC may employ forces to conduct medical

humanitarian and civil assistance to support local military

and civilian health systems or provide direct public health

care to include primary medical, dental, veterinary, and

other needed care. During stability operations the military

may need to provide public health services for

humanitarian reasons as well as to build community trust in

the HN government.

Education. Military activities to support education

programs generally focus on physical infrastructure.

Transitions. Because humanitarian assistance is largely a civilian

endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the

termination of US or multinational military humanitarian

assistance activities will not normally coincide with the

termination of international efforts.

8

Executive Summary

Stability Operations Functions—Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

The economic stabilization

and infrastructure

function includes

programs conducted to

ensure an economy in

which people can pursue

opportunities for

livelihoods within a

predictable system of

economic governance

bound by law.

Economic stabilization consists of restoring employment

opportunities, initiating market reform, mobilizing

domestic and foreign investment, supervising monetary

reform, and rebuilding public structures. Infrastructure

restoration consists of the reconstitution of power,

transportation, communications, health and sanitation, fire

fighting, education, mortuary services, and environmental

control.

Economic and infrastructure security and development are

inherently civilian undertakings; however, the presence of

US forces will almost always have an impact, even

indirectly, on this area. There may be times when more

direct military involvement in economic development will

be necessary: for example, when conditions restrict civilian

movement or when civilian agencies have not yet arrived in

the area.

Evaluation and

assessment.

Each country has a unique economic structure based on its

resources, the needs of the people, laws, customs,

traditions, and level of development. The assessment

should describe the situation, end state, CDR’s intent, and

national strategic objectives to stabilize a post-conflict

economy, reduce the economic drivers of conflict, and

increase institutional capacity. The four steps in conducting

an economic assessment are: compile a country economic

profile; develop a country economic implementation

plan; identify and analyze the economic drivers of any

ongoing conflict; and prepare an economic section for

inclusion in an initial staff estimate.

Military contribution. Employment Generation. Providing employment is an immediate peacekeeping task, a post-conflict objective, and

a means of establishing the foundation for future economic

growth and political stability. Key determinants of the

appropriate nature of the military role in employment

generation include the general security environment, the

condition of the economic-related infrastructure, the scope

of the need for employment generation programs, and the

access of civilian responders to the area.

Monetary Policy. Establishing a central bank system and

basic monetary policy is foundational to a recovering

economy. The military contribution to this establishment is

peripheral and should be thought of strictly in terms of

9

Executive Summary

providing required security, supporting resources (e.g.,

USG office equipment, specific CA expertise).

Fiscal Policy and Governance. The military will

contribute to HN fiscal actions by providing security for

financial institutions and for cash distribution, including

salary or contractual payments, as required.

Critical Infrastructure. The joint force may be called

upon to support infrastructure development by providing

security, funding and materiel, CA functional expertise, or

construction.

Quick impact projects. Quick impact projects (QIPs) are relatively short-term,

small-scale, low-cost, and rapidly implemented

stabilization or development initiatives that are designed to

deliver an immediate and highly visible impact, generally

at the local provincial or community level. In more

permissive environments, it is only where there is a

capability gap that cannot be filled by another actor, or

where the military possesses particular specialist skills that

QIPs are likely to be implemented by the joint force. Where

provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) or other

interagency field-based teams (e.g., field advance civilian

teams) exist, much of this activity will be funded, planned,

and implemented by development agencies coordinated

through the PRT or interagency team.

Other considerations. Other considerations for economic stabilization and

infrastructure include: ownership issues; cost recovery;

getting services to those in need; contracting as a

management tool; business, legal and regulatory

environment; maintenance standards; security; and

accountability, auditing, and financial oversight.

Transitions. JFCs must anticipate the transition from military to civilian

program management and plan actions supportive of the

long-term strategy. Joint forces can provide immediate

support for economic stabilization, but the programs are

frequently not viewed as long-term solutions. To maximize

project effectiveness, these projects should be sequenced

with the work of international civilian agencies and with

the private sector to ensure continuity of effort with

employees, functions, and support. The military’s role is to

help restore normalcy and fill the gap until civilian-led,

longer-term programs commence.

10

Executive Summary

Stability Operations Functions—Rule of Law

The rule of law is

fundamental to legitimate

governance.

The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to

ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private,

and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is

supreme. Perceived inequalities in the administration of the

law, and real or apparent injustices, are triggers for

instability.

Security Sector Reform. SSR centers not only on the

security forces of the HN, but also on broader rule of law

initiatives. The overall objective of SSR is to provide an

effective and legitimate public service that is transparent,

accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the

needs of the public.

Staff Judge Advocate Review of Rule of Law Programs.

Programs to influence the legal systems of the HN are not

above the law. Apart from US policy considerations,

stability operations in the rule of law must themselves be

governed by the rule of law; actions must be reviewed to

ensure that they comply with applicable provisions of US

law, international law, and HN law, as well as any UN or

other international mandate governing the intervention.

Evaluation and

assessment.

The necessary first step is an effective assessment that is

comprehensive enough to provide situational understanding

of the status of rule of law and that describes the

deficiencies in a country’s justice and security systems and

does so holistically.

One of the most important initial steps in conducting rule of

law programs is determining what law applies in the HN. If

the JFC lacks understanding of the HN legal system and

how it functions, it will be difficult to make informed

decisions about how US forces can or should operate in

relation to that system.

Military contribution. Establishing an Interim Criminal Justice System. When conditions require the restoration of governance,

establishing an interim justice system is a prerequisite.

Civilian agencies normally support the development of an

interim criminal justice system; however, when operating

in a failed state, especially during and immediately after

conflict, the joint force may be required to supply military

police, legal, CA, and other personnel to fulfill these roles.

11

Executive Summary

Personal Property. One of the most vital services

provided by the judiciary branch is the resolution of

property disputes. Typically, the military’s role in resolving

disputes is limited unless the joint force implements these

mechanisms in the absence of a functioning HN

government.

War Crimes Tribunals and Truth Commissions. While

a military governing authority may operate military

commissions and provost courts, the international

community oversees the conduct of war crimes courts,

tribunals, and truth commissions.

Transitions. The military’s role in ensuring rule of law, other than

providing security, is normally limited; however, when

operating in a failed or failing state, especially during and

immediately after conflict, the joint force may be required

to play a direct role in capacity building of justice systems

and security sectors. As soon as the security situation

warrants, these programs should be transitioned to civilian

agencies, either from the US or multinational partners, or

those of the HN.

Stability Operations Functions—Governance and Participation

Stable governance

provides a foundation on

which rule of law and

economic activity can

thrive and become drivers

of security and stability.

Governance and participation refers to programs conducted

to help the people to share, access, or compete for power

through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the

collective benefits and services of the state. Stable

governance is characterized by a government that provides

essential services and serves as a responsible steward of

public resources; government officials who are held

accountable through political and legal processes; and a

population that can participate in governance through civil

society organizations, an independent media, and political

parties. Military substitution for absent international

civilian leadership should be considered a temporary

solution, and civilian expertise and advice integrated into

the planning process through appropriate reachback or in-

theater advisors.

Evaluation and

assessment.

The Democracy and Governance Assessment is an

assessment framework developed by USAID, designed to

assist civilian and military leaders prioritize and administer

HN governance areas needing assistance. Data collection

and analysis may involve a combination of research and

interviews or focus group sessions with key country

12

Executive Summary

stakeholders. Particularly when combined with the

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework assessment of

any ongoing conflict, the Democracy and Governance

Assessment helps identify and assess key issues, key

people, and key institutions in HN governance.

Military contribution. Support National Constitution Processes. When the HN has no government, as may be the case during immediate

post-conflict reconstruction or interventions in failed states,

developing a national constitution is typically an important

first step to establishing a foundation for governance and

the rule of law. The military can support this process both

with CA functional expertise, as required, and the provision

of security and logistic support for key constitutional

processes such as debates and balloting.

Support Transitional Governance. The military may

support transitional governments through CMO support to

civil administration (SCA) as well as providing security to

governmental leaders and institutions of all branches of the

government. Efforts to support transitional governance are

shared between DOS and DOD, with leadership depending

on the circumstances.

Support Local Governance. Even before national

governance institutions and processes are established, the

joint force should support the establishment of effective

governance at the local level. The military support to local

governance may include restoring essential services as

required, providing CMO SCA, or providing security to

governmental leaders and institutions of all branches of the

government.

Support Anticorruption Initiatives. Corruption

undermines confidence in the state, impedes the flow of

aid, concentrates wealth into the hands of a generally

unelected, unaccountable, and illegitimate minority, and

provides elites with illicit means of protecting their

positions and interests.

Support Elections. While civilian agencies and

organizations that maintain strict transparency guide the

elections process, military forces provide the support that

enables broad participation by the local populace. This

certainly includes security, but may also include logistic

support.

13

Executive Summary

Local governance and

building on local

capacities.

Joint force governance efforts should build on the

foundations of existing capacity—however insubstantial

they are, be they formal or informal, be they national or

local. By identifying existing capacities on which to build,

governance capacity building is more likely to develop

approaches that are both systemically desirable and

culturally feasible.

Essential services. Whether following a US intervention or during peacekeeping operations, COIN operation, or other

intervention, or in response to a natural disaster, the

restoration of essential services in a fragile area is a key

action to achieve security. This basic function of local

governance is often lost during conflict and other disasters;

efforts to restore governance, particularly at the local level,

should focus on essential services—generally referred to as

SWEAT-MSO: sewage, water, electricity, academics

(meaning schools), trash, medical, safety, and other

considerations.

As with all stability operations, the joint force follows the

lead of other USG agencies, particularly USAID, in the

restoration of essential services. In many circumstances,

local or international development and humanitarian

organizations may be operating in theater and able to fulfill

this function. The military contribution will be focused on

enabling them to expand their access to the population.

However, only military forces may be able to operate in

some areas.

Elections. In a post-conflict environment, elections are often one of

the first and most visible steps toward nonviolent political

transition, signaling the transfer of authority from the

international community to HN leaders.

Without the establishment

of a secure environment,

an election is prone to

failure.

In this context, the ability of US or multinational forces to

conduct an election support mission successfully, in

particular through achieving a secure environment, can be

critical to the establishment of a legitimate government and

attainment of overall mission objectives. The JFC, or

liaisons, should participate in principals, donors,

implementing agencies coordination to help coordinate and

integrate security and election implementation strategies.

14

Executive Summary

Media. The media can be an important accountability mechanism

for the government, helping to maintain the rule of law.

Additionally, media can be useful in identifying gaps in

government services through advocacy.

Joint forces may establish media outlets to meet the need to

convey information to the public immediately, to dispel

rumors, and to counteract the effects of hate speech and

inflammatory propaganda. These efforts are often designed

to preempt or compete with media outlets controlled by

adversaries. The joint force may need to fill the vacuum in

the provision of critical information to the population about

stabilization activities, especially when free and

independent media are lacking.

Support to civil

administration.

SCA is assistance to stabilize a foreign government. SCA

consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting

with those activities that reinforce or restore civil

administration.

SCA in friendly territory includes advising friendly

authorities and performing specific functions within the

limits of authority and liability established by international

treaties and agreements. SCA in occupied territory

encompasses the establishment of a transitional military

authority, as directed by the Secretary of Defense, to

exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over

the populace of a territory that US forces have taken from

an enemy by force of arms until an indigenous civil

government can be established.

Other considerations. The burdens of governance require culturally astute leaders and joint forces capable of adapting to nuances of religion,

ethnicity, and a number of other considerations essential to

success.

The military force should, consistent with security

requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the

legitimate activities of religious leaders.

Archives and records, current and historical, of all branches

of the former government should be secured and preserved.

Large quantities of mail and other documents are often

found in post offices or at other points of central

15

Executive Summary

communications. The joint force should seize, secure, and

protect such materials until the forces can process and

deliver them.

In general, the joint force protects and preserves all

historical and cultural sites, monuments, and works;

religious shrines and objects of art; and any other national

collections of artifacts or art.

Successful capacity building relies on dependable vetting

processes to screen potential civil servants from the HN.

These processes help CDRs select qualified, competent

officials while reducing the threat of security risks.

Transitions. Poorly timed and conceived transitions create opportunities

for hostile groups to exploit. This is particularly the case if

the HN government fails to adequately discharge a

responsibility that was previously successfully discharged

by intervening organizations. Such an outcome severely

undermines population confidence in the government.

The transition of governance to HN authorities will not

occur by default. Establishing sustainable governance must

involve extensive international and interagency

coordination from the very beginning to ensure a successful

transition. Joint force support to governance should focus

on restoring the capacity of the HN, as well as enabling the

other USG agencies and IGOs. All MOE, end state,

transition, and termination planning should reflect this goal.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the conduct of

stability operations during joint operations within the

broader context of USG efforts. It provides guidance for

operating across the range of military operations to support

USG agencies, foreign governments, and IGOs, or to lead

such missions, tasks, and activities until it is feasible to

transfer lead responsibility.

16